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Rocheville v. Moore,
No. 98-23, 1999 WL 140668

(4th Cir. Mar. 16, 1999)1
David Rocheville ("Rocheville") filed a petition for federal habeas
corpus relief challenging his conviction and death sentence for the murders
of Alex Hopps and James Todd Green. After the District Court granted
the State's motion for summary judgment, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that Rocheville had failed to
show that his constitutional rights had been denied and dismissed his
appeal.2 Rocheville raised, and the court rejected, five ineffective assistance
of counsel claims.3
Rocheville's claim that the prosecutor impermissibly alluded during
closing arguments to Rocheville's decision not to testify, and his claim that
his own counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on appeal were
procedurally defaulted4 because they had not been raised on direct appeal or
during state habeas proceedings.5 Thus, although the United States Supreme
Court has squarely held that any comment at trial on a defendant's decision
not to testify violates his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, 6
this constitutional violation will not be remedied on federal habeas review
unless the issue has been preserved on direct appeal and at state habeas
proceedings. Accordingly, it is imperative that issues of this kind be raised
at trial and litigated throughout the entire appellate process.
Because the Supreme Court of South Carolina rejected Rocheville's
three remaining claims on their merits, the Fourth Circuit, following the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA")7
would not disturb these holdings unless they involved "an unreasonable
1. This is an unpublished opinion which is referenced in the "Table of Decisions
Without Reported Opinions" at 175 F.3d 1015 (4th Cir. 1999).
2. Rocheville v. Moore, No. 98-23, 1999 WL 140668, at *7 (4th Cir. Mar. 16, 1999).
3. In addition, Rocheville raised three claims based upon South Carolina law, which
are not discussed in this summary because of their irrelevance to Virginia capital law.
4. Rocheville, 1999 WL 140668, at *6.
5. Under the laws of South Carolina, the mechanism by which a prisoner can
challenge his incarceration is the action for postconviction relief (PCR), which is analogous
to a state habeas action. See id., at *1.
6. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
7. 28 U.S.C. Title 153, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L.No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
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application of clearly established Supreme Court case law."8 Thus, the
Fourth Circuit deferred to the South Carolina court's resolution of several
claims. The South Carolina Court had held that (1) Rocheville's attorney
had made competent attempts to deal with the problem of pre-trial publicity;9 (2) his attorney was not ineffective for failing to object to a police
detective's testimony about Rocheville's invocation of his right to counsel
because the testimony was not used as evidence of guil; 0 and (3) his attorney's strategy of admitting guilt and focusing on mitigation was not unreasonable in light of Rocheville's confession to police." Rocheville v. Moore
illustrates the difficulties of raising new issues and challenging state courts'
adjudications on the merits in federal habeas proceedings in light of the
Fourth Circuit's stringent procedural default rules and AEDPA.
Matthew L. Engle
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